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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2009, The Washington Post ran a 1600-word story about a former 
Kenyan hotel executive turned ―leadership coach‖ who teaches baby 
boomer executives how to understand their younger employees.
1
  That 
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Comment. 
 1. Ian Shapira, Speaking to Generation Nexus, WASH. POST, July 9, 2009, at C1. 
 same day, a condensed version of the story appeared on the culture and 
media website Gawker featuring quotes, biographical information and other 
tidbits—all cut-and-pasted or rewritten from the Post.2  Just like that, in a 
process that took roughly thirty minutes, Gawker was able to republish and 
generate advertising revenue off a story that took Post staff writer Ian 
Shapira hours to report and about a full day to write.
3
 
Gawker‘s unauthorized use of the Post‘s content illustrates an increasing 
problem in the Internet age that threatens to cripple organizations that 
invest in original reporting, thereby harming American democracy by 
leaving citizens less informed.
4
  While readers are flocking online to get 
their news,
5
 news originators like the Post are earning little revenue from 
online advertising.
6
  This is partly because with a few mouse clicks, anyone 
with Internet access can copy news stories online and repost the 
information while it is fresh,
7
 eliminating the typical ―lead time‖ advantage 
of being first.
8
  This activity—commonly referred to as free-riding9—costs 
                                                 
 2. Compare id. (showing the original Washington Post story), with Hamilton Nolan, 
„Generational Consultant‟ Holds America‟s Fakest Job, GAWKER.COM (July 9, 2009, 11:52 
AM), http://gawker.com/5310986/generational-consultant-holds-americas-fakest-job 
(showing Gawker‘s version of the Post story). 
 3. See Ian Shapira, How Gawker Ripped Off My Story & Why It‟s Destroying 
Journalism* *And There‟s Pretty Much Nothing I Can Do About It, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 
2009, at B1 (explaining that the Post writer conducted a lengthy phone interview with 
leadership coach Anne Loehr, traveled to Loehr‘s two-hour seminar, and spent four hours 
transcribing the session). 
 4. There has always been some form of free-riding with respect to news, but prior to 
the Internet the reproduction costs were greater and there was more of a lag-time to 
reproduce content.  See Ryan T. Holte, Note, Restricting Fair Use to Save the News:  A 
Proposed Change in Copyright Law to Bring More Profit to News Reporting, 13 J. TECH. L. 
& POL‘Y 1, 12 (2008) (explaining that newspapers and broadcasters could choose when to 
release stories so as not to allow competitors to repeat them during peak hours, and in some 
cases not until the following day); see also David Marburger & Dan Marburger, Op-Ed., 
.Com Internet Parasites, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2009, at A28 (asserting that while television 
stations have long aired rewritten newspaper stories, those broadcasts were not direct 
substitutes for newspapers, unlike Internet aggregators). 
 5. See Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism & Pew Internet & American Life 
Project, Online:  Audience Behavior, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2010, 
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/online_audience.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2011) 
(finding that sixty-one percent of Americans typically get their news online each day, a 
greater share than newspapers). 
 6. Cf. Marburger, supra note 4 (noting that although the San Francisco Chronicle‘s 
website attracts millions of readers, the paper almost closed recently because it was losing 
massive amounts of money). 
 7. See Brief Amici Curiae of Advance Publ‘ns, Inc. et al. Not in Support of Any Party 
at 9, Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., No. 10-1372-cv (2d Cir. June 22, 
2010) (hereinafter Amici Curiae of Advance Publ‘ns) (explaining that modern technology 
allows a free-rider to immediately republish original news content and earn revenue from 
that content). 
 8. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (1995) 
(stating that situations in which a plaintiff is deprived of its lead time provide ―the most 
compelling case for protection against appropriation‖). 
 9. See Chi. Prof‘l Sports LP v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 
1992) (defining free-riding as ―the diversion of value from a business rival‘s efforts without 
payment‖). 
 next to nothing, allowing websites that heavily excerpt news stories to 
compete directly with news originators for readers while driving down the 
cost of ads and the value of original news content.
10
 
Although the public typically benefits from increased competition, those 
who free-ride on news originators have the opposite effect.
11
  First, free-
riders are not more efficient at reporting the news (they are not reporting at 
all); they are simply taking news obtained by others.
12
  While free-riders 
can survive with steeply discounted advertising, companies that gather and 
report the news cannot because they must bear the enormous cost of 
gathering information.
13
  Second, these free-riders are siphoning away 
readers from newspaper websites.  Assuming a site such as Gawker even 
bothers to link to the original story, there is often little reason for someone 
to read the same material twice.
14
  The result:  fewer clicks on a newspaper 
website hurt the paper‘s ability to recover its costs through advertising, 
subscriptions, and content-licensing, which in turn leaves less money to 
invest in newsgathering.
15
   
                                                 
 10. See Marburger, supra note 4 (discussing the practice of surrounding rewritten news 
stories with inexpensive ads). 
 11. The practice of free-riding on the news comes in various forms.  In some cases, a 
website such as Google News will use software that combs the Internet for headlines and the 
first few sentences of a story and then repost the information onto the free-rider‘s own sites.  
See KIMBERLY ISBELL, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, THE RISE OF THE NEWS AGGREGATOR:  
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670339 
(detailing the various models of news aggregators).  In other cases, similar to the Gawker 
example above, the website will hire its own staff to troll the Internet for news and then 
rewrite the stories—sometimes even claiming credit for the content.  See, e.g., Associated 
Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining 
that All Headline News was accused of hiring ―poorly paid individuals‖ to find stories 
online and then rewrite and publish the stories under its own name). 
 12. Media mogul Rupert Murdoch, who owns The Wall Street Journal, has equated 
aggregators with thieves.  See David Sarno, Murdoch Accuses Google of News Theft, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at B1 (quoting Murdoch, who argued that:  ―[t]heir almost wholesale 
misappropriation of our stories is not fair use.  To be impolite, it‘s theft‖).  
 13. See Amici Curiae of Advance Publ‘ns, supra note 7, at 9–10 (pointing out that news 
organizations spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to pay the salaries of reporters 
and editors and to send journalists to war zones and other remote locations where news 
occurs, which is a cost that free-riders do not face).  Indeed, major newspapers are ailing 
across the country as ad revenue plummets.  See Douglas A. McIntyre, The 10 Most 
Endangered Newspapers in America, TIME (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1883785,00.html (highlighting those 
newspapers that have already closed and those that are at the greatest risk of closing). 
 14. Even the author of a newspaper story detailing how his story was republished by a 
free-rider admits he probably would not have read the piece if he first saw the condensed 
version that appeared on a blog.  See Shapira, supra, note 3 (contemplating whether the 
average blog visitor would click on a hyperlink to the original news provider after reading 
the condensed version, and answering:  ―I probably wouldn‘t have‖). 
 15. See generally Jennifer Saba, More Readers Skimming Google Headlines Than 
Going Directly to Newspaper Web Sites?, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, (Jan. 19, 2010), available 
at http://www.editorandpublisher.com/Headlines/more-readers-skimming-google-headlines-
than-going-directly-to-newspaper-web-sites-27131-.aspx (explaining that readers are 
increasingly skimming headlines on news aggregator sites rather than clicking on newspaper 
websites). 
 Media organizations are increasingly fighting back against those who 
republish their content without authorization,
16
 but putting a stop to free-
riding is problematic and better legal remedies are needed.
17
  Copyright law 




One such legal solution is hot news misappropriation, a doctrine that 
stems from the law of unfair competition.
19
  The doctrine, which the 
Supreme Court established more than ninety years ago in International 
News Service v. Associated Press,
20
 (―INS‖), allows the original publisher 
of a news story to prevent a competitor from using the facts, ―until its 
commercial value as news . . . has passed away.‖21  The Supreme Court has 
never directly revisited INS, and legal scholars question whether the 
doctrine remains viable in light of the 1976 Copyright Act‘s federal 
preemption provision
22
 and the Court‘s modern rulings on free speech.23  
Today, only a handful of states recognize hot news misappropriation.
24
 
                                                 
 16. See, e.g., All Headline News, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 457–58 (detailing that Associated 
Press (AP) sued All Headline News for allegedly rewriting AP stories and then passing them 
off as its own); Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 3–9, Dow Jones & Co. v. 
Briefing.com, Inc., No. 1:  10-cv-03321-VM (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 20, 2010) (hereinafter 
Dow Jones Complaint) (describing Dow Jones‘ lawsuit against briefing.com for 
misappropriating its news and headlines in near real-time); First Amended Complaint for 
Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Copyright Infringement ¶ 20–93, Agence France 
Presse v. Google, Inc., No. 1:  05-cv-00546-GK (D.D.C. filed Apr. 29, 2005) (outlining 
Agence France Presse‘s lawsuit against Google over the unauthorized use of its headlines, 
stories, and photos).  Besides these cases, the Las Vegas Review-Journal is suing more than 
thirty websites for copyright infringement for using the newspaper‘s content without 
permission.  See James Rainey, Review-Journal Bares Its Claws, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2010, 
at D1 (describing dozens of lawsuits filed against publishers, such as a blog for cat 
enthusiasts to sites about sports betting and advertising). 
 17. See generally Bruce W. Sanford & Bruce D. Brown, Laws That Could Save 
Journalism, WASH. POST, May 16, 2009, at A15 (suggesting myriad solutions to support the 
ailing news business, including a recommendation to federalize the hot news doctrine).  
 18. See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (stating 
that facts and ideas within a work are ―free for the taking‖).  For example, as further 
illustrated in the text accompanying endnotes 173–77, the facts within a news story (e.g. the 
number of people killed in a plane crash) are free for others to use, but the way those facts 
are stated and arranged in a news story is protected expression. 
 19. FTC Staff Discussion Draft:  Potential Policy Recommendations to Support the 
Reinvention of Journalism, FED. TRADE COMM‘N, 8, available at 
 http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/jun15/docs/new-staff-discussion.pdf (hereinafter 
FTC Staff Discussion Draft) (discussing that hot news misappropriation can protect an 
organization‘s investment in the facts for a limited time) (last visited Nov. 17, 2010). 
 20. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 21. Id. at 245. 
 22. See infra note 234 (pointing out the differing viewpoints on the issue of 
preemption). 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 134–142 (explaining how First Amendment 
doctrine has evolved since INS). 
 24. See Bruce W. Sanford et al., Saving Journalism with Copyright Reform and the 
Doctrine of Hot News, 26 COMM. LAW. 8, 9 (2009) (stating that the hot news 
misappropriation doctrine is recognized in five states).  Those states are:  California, Illinois, 
Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania.  See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 534 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (applying Illinois law); Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 
 This Comment will argue that in addition to remaining viable, hot news 
misappropriation is an increasingly important legal tool in the digital era 
that more states should embrace—particularly to protect original 
newsgathering.  However, to ensure that hot news misappropriation 
survives federal preemption and does not encroach on free speech rights, 
this Comment will suggest a framework that courts should follow to ensure 
that the doctrine is narrowly applied. 
Part I of this Comment will discuss the limitations of copyright 
protections, the history of hot news misappropriation, and how courts have 
addressed the seemingly divergent goals of the First Amendment and 
intellectual property rights.  Part II will argue that copyright law cannot 
adequately protect news organizations in the digital age, leaving a void that 
a narrow application of hot news misappropriation should fill.  This Part 
will also recommend that courts should apply the doctrine by building on a 
legal framework first established by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Finally, Part III will argue that this narrow application of hot news 
misappropriation is not federally preempted and that the doctrine has the 
same policy goals as the First Amendment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Copyright Law‟s Limited Protection of Facts 
News organizations generally turn first to copyright law when seeking to 
halt the unauthorized republication of their content.
25
  Copyright is the 
primary legal tool for protecting works of authorship in the United States,
26
  
and its importance is underscored by the fact that federal copyright 
protections have existed almost since the nation‘s inception.27  The 
                                                 
845 (2d. Cir. 1997) (applying New York law); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 
974, 980 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (applying California law); Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, 
Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (applying Missouri 
law); Pottstown Daily News Publ‘g Co. v. Pottstown Broad. Co., 192 A.2d 657, 663–64 (Pa. 
1963) (applying Pennsylvania law); see also Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 
700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (asserting that New York is the most enthusiastic 
supporter of hot news). 
 25. See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d at 328 (holding that 
Theflyonthewall.com infringed copyrights by engaging in ―verbatim copying of key 
excerpts‖ of seventeen research reports published by Morgan Stanley and Lehman 
Brothers); see also Rainey, supra note 16, at D1 (reporting that a newspaper filed more than 
thirty copyright infringement lawsuits against websites and blogs that were using its content 
without permission). 
 26. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 411 (5th ed. 2010) (characterizing copyright law as ―a principal 
means for protecting works of authorship‖ and noting that it is a broad domain that is 
continuously expanding). 
 27. The first federal copyright act was passed in 1790, three years after the Constitution 
was adopted.  Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. 
 Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to ―secur[e] for limited Times 
to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.‖28 
Despite the importance of copyright, the law‘s protections are limited.  
While copyright protects an author‘s original expression, it does not protect 
the facts, ideas, or information within a work.
29
  Copyright protection is 
also limited by the ―fair use‖ doctrine (codified in the 1976 Copyright Act), 
which allows for the sharing of copyrighted material without the owner‘s 
authorization for certain purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, and research.
30
  Finally, copyright protections do not 
last indefinitely; the law generally offers protections for the life of the 
author, plus seventy years.
31
  Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart 
articulated a key policy reason for these limitations in Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken:
32
  ―Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, 
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.‖33 
1. Copyright and original expression 
Before 1991, courts sometimes awarded copyrights to works that lacked 
original expression, provided the data or facts were gathered 
independently.
34
  Generally, these courts wanted to encourage authors to 
invest the time and labor needed to create databases and other fact-based 
works requiring significant research because these works would have broad 
                                                 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (―In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.‖). 
 30. Id. § 107 (explaining that in addition to the purposes for which a work will be used, 
courts should also consider ―the nature of the copyrighted work; []the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used . . . ; and the effect of the use on the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work‖).  Congress has indicated that the factors listed in § 107 are 
illustrative rather than exhaustive.  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (explaining that because an infinite number of 
circumstances can potentially arise in the fair use context courts must be free to apply the 
fair use doctrine on a case-by-case basis). 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).  For a joint work prepared by at least two authors who did not 
work for hire, copyright lasts for the life of the last surviving author plus seventy years after 
the last surviving author‘s death.  Id. § 302(b).  If the work is anonymous, pseudonymous, 
or made for hire, the copyright lasts either ninety-five years from the year of its first 
publication, or 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.  Id. § 302(c).    
 32. 422 U.S. 151 (1975). 
 33. Id. at 156; see also Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the 
Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 420 
(1983) (stating that copyright seeks ―to give the gatherer of information an incentive [to 
create] against the countervailing need to give the public free access to ideas‖). 
 34. See, e.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 
132 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that the facts in a telephone directory were copyrightable); 
Jeweler‘s Circular Publ‘g Co. v. Keystone Publ‘g Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922) (stating 
that the right to copyright a book does not depend on whether its contents are original). 
 benefits to society.
35
  This approach, first articulated by a U.S. court in 
1922,
36
 came to be known as the ―sweat of the brow‖ doctrine.37   Nearly 
seventy years later, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected ―sweat of the 
brow‖ in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service,38 a case involving 
two competing telephone directory white pages.  Rural Telephone Service 
was a public utility that annually published a directory that alphabetically 
listed the names of its subscribers, their towns, and phone numbers.
39
  Feist, 
a publishing company that specialized in telephone directories, lacked 
independent access to Rural‘s subscriber information and offered to pay 
Rural for the rights to use its listings.
40
  When Rural refused, Feist copied 
the information anyway.
41
  In the end, more than 1300 of Feist‘s listings 
were identical to Rural‘s.42  Rural sued for copyright infringement, but the 
Court rejected its claim and held that not all copying is copyright 
infringement.
43
   
As explained by the Feist Court, copyright infringement requires two 
elements:  (1) the owner must hold a valid copyright, and (2) the alleged 
infringer must copy elements of an original work.
44
  The Court quickly 
determined that the first element was not an issue by finding that Rural‘s 
telephone directory, as a whole, was copyrightable because it contained 
some original expression such as foreword text and yellow pages 
advertisements.
45
  The second element, Feist‘s copying of 1300 listings, 
was problematic.  The Court stated that even if Rural was the first to 
discover and publish the names, towns, and phone numbers in a telephone 
directory, this information already existed—and would continue to exist—
                                                 
 35. See generally Charles Brill, Legal Protection of Collection of Facts, 1998 
COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 1, 2 (1998) (discussing that when compilers put raw data into 
searchable databases it benefits society by making the information readily accessible and 
digestible, and warning that society will lose these benefits if the compilers of this data can 
no longer recoup their investment). 
 36. See Jeweler‟s Circular Publ‟g Co., 281 F. at 88 (explaining that when a person 
records the names, addresses, and occupations of a town‘s inhabitants, he is the author of 
that material, and commenting further that ―[h]e produces by his labor a meritorious 
composition, in which he may obtain a copyright, and thus obtain the exclusive right of 
multiplying copies of his work‖). 
 37. E.g., Earth Flag Ltd. v. Alamo Flag Co., 154 F. Supp. 2d 663, 668 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (citation omitted) (explaining that the underlying principle behind the ―sweat of the 
brow‖ doctrine was to offer ―copyright [as] a reward for the hard work that went into 
compiling facts‖). 
 38. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 39. Id. at 342. 
 40. Id. at 342–43. 
 41. Id. at 343. 
 42. Id. at 344. 
 43. Id. at 361.  
 44. Id.; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 
(1985) (providing the basis for Feist‘s two-part test by explaining that while a work as a 
whole may be copyrighted, non-original elements within that work are free for the taking). 
 45. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. 
 regardless of whether the directory was ever published.
46
  Put more simply, 




This is because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship.  The 
distinction is one between creation and discovery:  The first person to 
find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has 
merely discovered its existence. . . . The same is true of all facts—
scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day.
48
 
Thus, even though Rural had a valid copyright for its directory, the facts 
within the directory remained free for others to use.
49
  Copyright protection 
is limited to the particular selection or arrangement of those facts.
50
 
The Court explained that although it may seem unfair that a competitor 
can use the fruit of another‘s labor without compensation, it is ―the essence 
of copyright‖ and a constitutional requirement that others be allowed to 
freely build on information contained in a work.
51
  Yet, the Court also 
commented, without further elaboration, that in certain circumstances the 
fruits of research may be protectable outside of copyright law under the 
theory of unfair competition.
52
 
2. Copyright and fair use 
The fair use doctrine also limits a plaintiff‘s ability to recover under 
copyright law.  Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act states:  ―[T]he fair 
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . . 
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.‖53  Section 
107 then lists four factors for the courts to consider when determining 
whether the use is fair:  (1) the purpose of the use, including whether it is 
for commercial or nonprofit educational purposes, (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work, (3) the amount of the work that is used, and (4) the 
                                                 
 46. Id.  The Court explained that ―[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality.‖  Id. at 
345.  
 47. Id. at 347. 
 48. Id. at 347–48 (emphasis added).  The Court referenced INS to explain that the news 
element within a work is not copyrightable because it is not the creation of the writer, but 
rather ―the history of the day.‖  Id. at 353–54. 
 49. Id. at 349. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 349–50 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,  
471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 52. Id. at 354.  One commentator notes that despite this suggestion by the Court, it is 
not clear how unfair competition law would provide protection for the fruits of labor.  See S. 
Leigh Fulwood, Feist v. Rural:  Did the Supreme Court Give License to Reap Where One 
Has Not Sown?, 9 COMM. LAW. 15, 16 (1991) (calling the Court‘s remark about unfair 
competition ―cryptic‖ and noting that the Court supported its language with a treatise that is 
equally unclear). 
 53. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work.
54
  The 
House report that accompanied § 107 indicates that courts are not expected 
to follow a specific formula when considering these factors.
55
  Instead, the 
fair use doctrine should be applied on a case-by-case basis using an 
―equitable rule of reason‖ analysis.56   
The only Supreme Court ruling involving fair use and news reporting is 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.
57
   
In that case, The Nation magazine received a leaked manuscript of 
President Ford‘s autobiography and published an unauthorized excerpt, 
thereby ―scooping‖ Time magazine, which had paid for the exclusive rights 
to print prepublication excerpts.
58
  The Nation admitted to directly copying 
portions of the manuscript author‘s original language, but argued that its 
actions constituted fair use of copyrighted material.
59
  The Second Circuit 
agreed, holding that the purpose of the article was ―news reporting,‖ which 
is specifically mentioned as an example of activities that may be considered 
fair use under section 107.
60
 
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the article‘s news content was 
just one factor to consider.
61
  The Court went on to examine each of the 
four factors in section 107, ruling against The Nation for each one.
62
  For 
the first factor, the Court determined that the article‘s commercial 
publication, rather than nonprofit use, weighed against fair use.
63
  For the 
second factor, the Court explained that the law ―generally recognizes a 
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or 
fantasy.‖64  Although this language seemed to favor The Nation, the Court 
explained that the magazine focused on the most expressive elements of the 
Ford manuscript rather than the brief phrases or quotes necessary to 
disseminate the facts.
65
  For the third factor, the Court noted that although 
the words quoted by The Nation were a small portion of the manuscript, 
they were ―essentially the heart of the book.‖66  Finally, for the fourth 
                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, ch. 1, at 65–66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5679–80. 
 56. Id. at 65. 
 57. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 58. Id. at 542. 
 59. See id. at 548 (explaining that 300 to 400 words were directly copied, constituting 
about thirteen percent of The Nation article). 
 60. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983); 
rev‟d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); see supra text accompanying note 53 (quoting  
§ 107). 
 61. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561 (explaining that § 107 was not intended to 
provide a list of uses that automatically qualified as fair use). 
 62. Id. at 561–69. 
 63. Id. at 562. 
 64. Id. at 563. 
 65. Id. at 563–64. 
 66. Id. at 564–65. 
 factor, the Court determined that The Nation‘s actions significantly 
undermined the potential market for the copyrighted work.
67
  In this case, 
Time canceled its plans to write about the Ford manuscript and refused to 
pay $12,500 to Harper & Row.
68
 
B. The Emergence and Evolution of Hot News Misappropriation 
When copyright law is unable to provide adequate relief, some news 
organizations have turned to another doctrine:  hot news misappropriation.  
Hot news has been called ―one of the strangest torts in intellectual property 
law‖—in part because it protects facts already in the public domain.69  A 
United States court first addressed whether a news organization‘s facts 
could be protected by the law in 1876.
70
  But INS, decided more than thirty 
years later, marked the first time the Supreme Court established hot news 
misappropriation by ruling that news, gathered at great expense, was 




1. INS and hot news‟ beginnings 
INS involved two wire services that were competing to deliver news 
about World War I to newspapers across the United States.
72
  International 
News Service (―INS‖) had been kicked out of Europe, leaving the company 
without reporters to cover the war and prompting INS to rely on dispatches 
from The Associated Press (AP).
73
  The AP alleged that INS was obtaining 
its stories in several ways:  from early-edition newspapers on the East 
Coast, by reading bulletin board postings, or even by bribing AP 
                                                 
 67. Id. at 566–67.  The Court stated that the fourth element was the most important 
factor to determining fair use.  Id. at 566.  But nine years later, the Court backed away from 
that stance.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (holding 
that the fourth factor provides no evidentiary presumption of whether the use is fair). 
 68. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567. 
 69. See Stephen M. Kramarsky, „Hot News‟ Tort Swats Flyonthewall.com, N.Y.L.J., 
(Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202447125430 (explaining that the 
use of publicly available information does not usually infringe on any legal rights).  The 
author also states that hot news is unusual because one of the elements is ―sweat of the 
brow,‖ which the Supreme Court rejected in 1991.  Id.; see also supra notes 38–52 and 
accompanying text (discussing Feist and the Court‘s rationale for rejecting ―sweat of the 
brow‖). 
 70. See VICTORIA SMITH EKSTRAND, NEWS PIRACY AND THE HOT NEWS DOCTRINE:  
ORIGINS IN LAW AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 43–44 (2005) (―It would be an 
atrocious doctrine to hold that dispatches, the result of the diligence and expenditure of one 
man, could with impunity be pilfered and published by another.‖ (quoting Kiernan v. 
Manhattan Quotation Tel. Co., 50 How. Pr. 194, 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876))). 
 71. Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240 (1918); EKSTRAND, supra 
note 70, at 43–44. 
 72. Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 229–30. 
 73. See EKSTRAND, supra note 70, at 47 (explaining that INS reporters were kicked off 
the continent because both Europeans and Congress believed INS Chief William Randolph 
Hearst was pro-German). 
 employees.
74
  INS, according to AP, then rewrote the stories to sell to INS 
clients out West.
75
  Despite INS‘ behavior, the Court had few tools with 
which to help AP:  there was no copyright infringement because in most 
instances INS was simply copying the facts,
76
 and there was no theft of 
trade secrets because AP‘s stories were accessible to the public.77  The 
Court, however, made it clear that it was nevertheless disturbed by INS‘ 
business practices:   
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized 
interference with the normal operation of [AP‘s] legitimate business 
precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a 
material portion of the profit from those who have earned it to those who 
have not; with special advantage to [INS] in the competition because of 




The Court ruled that INS could be enjoined from using the AP‘s stories 
because it was engaged in a form of unfair competition.
79
  The Court 
declined to elaborate on how long the injunction should last.
80
  Instead, the 
Court reaffirmed the language of the district court in stating that INS was 
prevented from using AP‘s content until the commercial value of AP‘s 
news ―‗has passed away.‘‖81  The Court stated that without providing such 
protection, the AP could no longer justify the cost of gathering the news.
82
 
Unfortunately for the lower courts, the INS decision provided little 
guidance about when hot news misappropriation applies and how long 
news should remain ―hot.‖83  More than a decade after the decision, Judge 
Learned Hand—then sitting on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals—
warned of the difficulties of expanding INS‘ holding beyond the narrow 
facts of the case because it ―flagrantly conflict[ed]‖ with copyright and 
patent laws.
84
  INS‘ precedential value also was limited because federal 
                                                 
 74. Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 231. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 234 (observing that the ―news element . . . is not the creation of the writer, 
but . . . [rather] the history of the day‖). 
 77. See id. at 235 (noting that news gets its value by being spread to the world, not by 
remaining a secret). 
 78. Id. at 240. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 245–46 (declining to specify the exact terms of the injunction because of 
the ―practical difficulties‖ of the case). 
 81. Id. (citation omitted). 
 82. See id. at 240–41 (stating that ―[t]he cost . . . would be prohibited if the reward were 
to be so limited‖). 
 83. See EKSTRAND, supra note 70, at 83 (explaining that the Court did not outline a 
formal legal test, or whether the tort applied to content other than news, or how much harm 
was needed for a successful claim). 
 84. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).  Judge Hand 
also stated:   
While it is of course true that law ordinarily speaks in general terms, there are cases 
where the occasion is at once the justification for, and the limit of, what is decided. 
 general common law in diversity jurisdiction cases, on which INS was 
based, was abolished twenty years after the Court‘s decision.85  Since then, 
INS has survived only where it has been adopted as state common law.
86
 
Despite Judge Hand‘s concerns and the precedential limits placed on 
INS, the Court‘s holding was expanded under state common law far beyond 
the narrow circumstances of the original case—particularly to situations 
involving new technologies not addressed by copyright law where some 
form of unfair competition occurred.  For example, in the 1938 case 
Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co.,
87
 the owners of the 
Pittsburgh Pirates had an arrangement in which local NBC radio affiliates 
paid a fee for the exclusive right to broadcast the baseball team‘s games.88  
But another station, KQV, announced its intention to broadcast its own 
play-by-play reports by stationing reporters at certain locations outside the 
stadium.
89
  The Pirates sued, fearing that KQV‘s actions undermined the 
team‘s arrangement with the other stations.90  A federal court, relying 
heavily on INS, ruled for the Pirates, holding that KQV‘s actions interfered 
with the team‘s ―normal and legitimate business‖ and prevented the team 
from benefitting from its labor and expenditures in the games.
91
   
In 1950, INS‘ reach expanded even further when a New York state court 
held in Metropolitan Opera Ass‟n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.92 that 
direct competition—a key aspect of the INS decision—was no longer a 
necessary element.
93
  The court concluded that ―persons in theoretically 
non-competitive fields may, by unethical business practices, inflict as 
severe and reprehensible injuries upon others as can direct competitors.‖94   
                                                 
[INS] appears to us such an instance . . . . The difficulties of understanding it 
otherwise are insuperable. 
Id. 
 85. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that ―[t]here is no 
federal general common law‖ and that, except in matters governed by the U.S. Constitution 
or by acts of Congress, federal courts must abide by the law of the state in which the case 
arose); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (explaining that the holding in 
Erie was at least partly in response to forum-shopping, in which the parties choose a venue 
most likely to provide a favorable judgment).  
 86. See supra note 24 (indicating that only five states have adopted hot news 
misappropriation). 
 87. 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).  The case involved Pennsylvania common law, 
but was heard in district court because of the parties‘ diversity of citizenship and the amount 
in controversy.  Id. at 493. 
 88. Id. at 492.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 492–94. 
 92. 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). 
 93. Id. at 491–92. 
 94. Id. at 492. 
 2. Hot news and federal preemption 
Decades after INS was decided, the case‘s broad applicability was 
significantly reduced.  With the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress made it 
easier to protect emerging technologies so that INS-like protections were no 
longer needed.
95
  More significantly, the Copyright Act included a 
provision preempting all common or state law protections that:  (1) cover 
works ―that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression,‖ (2) cover 
subject matter specifically defined by federal copyright law, and (3) create 
legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the ―general scope‖ of copyright law.96 
Since then, misappropriation cases loosely based on INS have typically 
not been recognized by the courts.
97
  However, some courts, particularly 
the Second Circuit, continue to find that narrow INS-like claims remain 
viable.
98
  Until recently, though, there was much uncertainty about what 
elements were necessary to bring a successful claim.
99
  Finally, in 1997, the 
Second Circuit addressed much of the confusion about hot news 
misappropriation in National Basketball Ass‟n v. Motorola, Inc.100—a case 
in which the NBA filed a hot news claim against Motorola for the 
unauthorized transmission of the league‘s scores and other real-time data 
about games in progress to handheld pagers.
101
  The Court held that to 
survive preemption, the following five elements must be met:   
 (i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the 
information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant‘s use of the information 
                                                 
 95. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (permitting copyright protections for original works of 
authorship ―now known or later developed‖) (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. at § 301(a). 
 97. See, e.g., Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enters., 395 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 
(D.S.D. 2005) (holding that a pizza franchisee‘s misappropriation claim against a franchisor 
over an advertising slogan was preempted by federal copyright law); Travel Bug Ltd. v. 
Muscarello, No. 84 C 5467, 1986 WL 6941, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 1986) (ruling against a 
claim of misappropriation involving the alleged copying of a travel agency academy‘s 
policy manual because the claim was preempted by copyright law); Mitchell v. 
Penton/Indus. Publ‘g Co., 486 F. Supp. 22, 26 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (dismissing claim that 
defendant misappropriated certain information in plaintiff‘s book because such a claim was 
preempted by copyright law). 
 98. See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(establishing the five elements that must be met for a state claim of hot news 
misappropriation to survive); see also X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1106 
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that California‘s cause of action for hot news misappropriation 
should not be preempted based on the Second Circuit‘s reasoning in Motorola); Fred 
Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc.,  
73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (asserting that Missouri would likely allow a 
cause of action under a narrow application of hot news misappropriation). 
 99. See EKSTRAND, supra note 70, at 117 (explaining that INS indicated that labor and 
investment, time, free-riding, competition, and harm are all elements of hot news 
misappropriation, but noting that the Court did not outline these elements as a legal test or 
explain whether all needed to be met). 
 100. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 101. Id. at 843. 
 constitutes free riding on the plaintiff‘s efforts; (iv) the defendant is in 
direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs; and 
(v) the ability of the other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the 
plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to produce the product 




The Second Circuit ultimately ruled against the NBA, holding that only 
some of these elements existed.
103
  The information was time-sensitive and 
the league did provide a similar service to Motorola‘s, known as 
Gamestats.
104
  However, the court ruled that Motorola‘s paging system was 
not in direct competition with the NBA‘s primary business of producing 
basketball games and licensing copyrighted broadcasts of those games.
105
  
The court also held that there was no evidence that Motorola had engaged 
in free-riding on the league‘s collection of factual material about the 
games, such as scores and statistics, because Motorola used its own 
resources to collect that information.
106
  However, the court explained that 
free-riding would exist if Motorola were to collect facts directly from the 
NBA‘s Gamestats and retransmit the data to its own pagers, and that such 




Despite the guidance provided by Motorola, only eight cases have 
specifically addressed the five-part test in the past thirteen years.
108
  And, 
putting preemption concerns aside, critics question whether hot news 
misappropriation is even feasible.
109
  They argue that INS-like scenarios no 
longer exist because in today‘s media environment many stories build off 
each other and no one is simply breaking news that others steal or 
rewrite.
110
  As one commentator asserted, in the Internet age ―a true scoop 
lasts for about a minute.‖111 
                                                 
 102. Id. at 845. 
 103. Id. at 854. 
 104. Id. at 853. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 854 (explaining further that Motorola also used its own network to 
transmit the information). 
 107. See id. (holding that in this case, such free-riding was not occurring because 
Motorola‘s Gamestats was fairly competing with the NBA‘s SportsTrax in the marketplace).  
 108. The Second Circuit‘s decision in Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, was Keycited through 
Sept. 11, 2010. 
 109. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation:  A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 
625 (2003) (declaring that free- 
riding is ―too broad to serve as a guiding principle of the law‖ because it encompasses 
acceptable competition); David Blau, This Just In:  “Hot News” Law Is Yesterday‟s News, 
SUNSTEIN KANN MURPHY & TIMBERS LLP (March 2009),  
http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/publications-news/news-letters/2009/03/200903hotNews.html 
(asserting that the doctrine‘s time has passed because the economics of the news business 
have changed since INS was decided). 
 110. See Jeff Jarvis, There is No Hot News.  All News is Hot News., BUZZ MACHINE 
(June 28, 2010, 10:52 AM), http://www.buzzmachine.com/2010/06/28/there-is-no-hot-
 Yet media organizations have increasingly turned to the doctrine as they 
seek to protect their content from free-riders.
112
  In Associated Press v. All 
Headline News Corp.,
113
 New York district court Judge  
P. Kevin Castel ruled in 2009 that AP had a viable claim when it sued an 
Internet-based news service that was allegedly distributing AP content 
under its own name.
114
  Although the suit was eventually settled out of 
court, the decision marked the first time a hot news claim was found viable 
in the Internet age and signaled the continued relevance of the doctrine.
115
 
The same district court gave hot news misappropriation another boost in 
March when three Wall Street banks successfully sued 
Theflyonthewall.com (―Fly‖) for hot news misappropriation, claiming the 
financial website took the firms‘ investment research without authorization 
and redistributed the recommendations before the firms had a chance to 
share it with their clients.
116
  In Barclays Capital Inc. v. 
Theflyonthewall.com,
117
 district court judge Denise Cote ruled in favor of 
the firms after finding that all five elements  established in Motorola were 
met.
118
  The judge first stated that Fly did not dispute that the banks 
incurred significant expense coming up with recommendations to help their 
clients maximize returns on investments.
119
  Second, the judge determined 
that the recommendations were clearly time-sensitive because the clients 
used the information to make trades in anticipation of stock price 
                                                 
news-all-news-is-hot-news/ (arguing that the idea of hot news should be ―repellant‖ to 
journalists because the restrictions would limit all efforts to disseminate information freely).  
See generally Nate Anderson, Who Owns the Facts?  The AP and the “Hot News” 
Controversy, ARS TECHNICA (May 6, 2009, 11:18 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2009/05/who-owns-the-facts-the-ap-and-the-hot-news-controversy.ars (stating 
that unlike the early ―hot news‖ cases, today‘s process of newsgathering is ―mixed, blended, 
[and] messy‖).  
 111. Erick Schonfeld, Hot News:  The AP is Living in the Last Century, TECHCRUNCH 
(Feb. 22, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/02/22/hot-news-the-ap-is-living-in-the-last-
century/. 
 112. See, e.g., Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457–
58 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (involving AP‘s claims against an Internet-based news service for 
copying AP stories from websites and reselling the content); Dow Jones Complaint, supra 
note 16, ¶ 2–3, 7 (alleging that a website was routinely copying Dow Jones‘s stories and 
headlines). 
 113. 608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 114. See id. at 461 (stating that the hot news doctrine remains viable under New York 
law and that the defendants did not persuasively argue why the five-factor test in Motorola 
should be rejected). 
 115. See generally Blau, supra note 109 (asserting that the real story of Associated Press 
v. All Headline News Corp. is the ―possible revival‖ of the hot news doctrine and arguing 
that its granting of a ―quasi-property‖ right to news is problematic). 
 116. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
 117. 700 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 118. See id. at 335–42, 348 (analyzing each of the five factors in the Motorola test and 
ordering an injunction of Fly‘s copyright and misappropriation activities).  
 119. See id. at 335 (stating that the banks employ hundreds of analysts and spend 
millions annually on producing the reports). 
 movement.
120
  Third, Fly engaged in free-riding by making no investment 
of its own in equity research.
121
  Fourth, the banks and Fly were in direct 
competition because disseminating the recommendations was Fly‘s primary 
business and producing such reports was among the banks‘ primary 
businesses.
122
  The banks and Fly also distributed the recommendations in a 
similar fashion.
123
  Finally, the judge held that the banks‘ economic 
incentive to produce the recommendations was substantially threatened 
because, although the banks presented no statistical evidence, ―common 
sense and the circumstantial evidence about the plaintiffs‘ business model 
make the [banks‘] contentions about its reduced incentives utterly 
credible.‖124  The judge also set a specific time limit on how long the facts 
in question had value,
125
 preventing Fly from publishing pre-market 
research until thirty minutes after the stock market opens.
126
  Fly was also 
ordered to wait two hours to publish research issued while the market is 
open.
127
   
In May, however, the Second Circuit set aside the injunction pending an 
appeal by Fly.
128
  If the ruling survives, one commentator asserts that 
Theflyonthewall.com could be welcome news for traditional media 
organizations and bad news for aggregators because the district court‘s 
decision was detailed, thoroughly reasoned, and ―the product of a full-
blown trial, giving it a concreteness and specificity that other, Internet-
related hot news decisions . . . lack.‖129 
C. Hot News, Intellectual Property, and the First Amendment 
Aside from preemption concerns, the First Amendment has been 
described as the ―elephant in the room‖ when it comes to hot news 
                                                 
 120. See id. at 336 (noting that the banks engaged in a ―frenzied process‖ to be first to 
inform their clients). 
 121. Id. at 336–37 (explaining that although Fly attributed the information to the banks, 
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 122. Id. at 339. 
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 126. Id. at 347. 
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  This issue has gone unaddressed by the Supreme 
Court since the doctrine‘s beginnings.  In establishing hot news 
misappropriation in INS, the Court never discussed how a doctrine that 
restricts others from using facts in the public domain could co-exist with 
the First Amendment,
131
 which declares that ―Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.‖132  Justice Louis Brandeis‘ 
dissent in INS came closest:  ―The general rule of law is, that the noblest of 
human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and 
ideas—become after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to 
common use.‖133   
In the more than ninety years since INS, First Amendment case law has 
developed more fully.  In particular, the Supreme Court has established that 
prior restraints—official restrictions of speech before publication—are the 
most serious infringement of free speech.
134
  Since 1931, the Court has 
consistently found that such attempts  
to censor information are presumed unconstitutional.
135
  In the landmark 
case of Nebraska Press Ass‟n v. Stuart,136 for instance, the Court noted that 
―[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a ‗heavy 
presumption‘ against its constitutional validity,‖137 and that this burden is 
not diminished merely because the restraint is temporary.
138
  ―The 
damage,‖ the Court asserted, ―can be particularly great when the prior 
restraint falls upon the communication of news and commentary on current 
                                                 
 130. See Brief Amici Curiae of Citizen Media Law Project et al. in Support of Neither 
Party at 6, Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., No. 10-1372-cv (2d Cir. June 
24, 2010) (urging the Second Circuit to recognize the First Amendment implications of hot 
news when ruling on the Flyonthewall.com appeal). 
 131. Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (discussing copyright, 
property, unfair competition but not the First Amendment). 
 132. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 133. Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  One commentator 
suggests that the Supreme Court never bothered addressing whether hot news can sustain a 
First Amendment challenge because cases invoking the doctrine had largely disappeared 
from the courts.  Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:  The 
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You,  
52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1070 (2000). 
 134. See Neb. Press Ass‘n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541, 559 (1976) (denouncing prior 
restraint in the context of a state judge‘s order restricting the publishing of a murder 
suspect‘s possible admissions and calling prior restraint ―the most serious and the least 
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights‖). 
 135. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931) (holding that the 
primary purpose of constitutional protections for the press is preventing previous restraints 
on publication); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per 
curiam) (stating that ―the Government ‗thus carries a heavy burden‘‖ to justify the 
imposition of a prior restraint (citation omitted)); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 
58, 70 (1963) (―Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a 
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.‖). 
 136. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
 137. Id. at 558 (citation omitted). 
 138. Id. at 559.  
 events.‖139  The presumption against prior restraints is so significant, the 
Court continued, because such actions freeze speech—at least for a limited 
time.
140
  Even in instances where damages are sought after publication, like 
in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
141
 the Court emphasized that the 
First Amendment protects the publication of truthful information on 
matters of public interest, provided such information is lawfully obtained, 
and ―absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.‖142   
While First Amendment protections have grown more robust since INS, 
the Court has also recognized that the right to free speech has important 
limitations when intellectual property rights are involved.
143
  The Court 
emphasized this point in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
144
 
a case involving the common law ―right to publicity‖ doctrine, which 
prohibits the appropriation of a private citizen‘s name or likeness for 
commercial benefit.
145
  In Zacchini, a ―human cannonball‖ performer sued 
a television broadcasting company for broadcasting his entire act on 
television, claiming that the broadcast ―was an appropriation of his 
professional property.‖146  In ruling for the performer, the Court held that 
the First Amendment does not ―immunize‖ a media organization that 
broadcasts an entire performance without the performer‘s consent.147  The 
Court explained that the protection granted by the right of publicity 
provided the performer with an ―economic incentive‖ to produce a 
performance of public interest.
148
  ―This same consideration,‖ the court 
added, ―underlies the patent and copyright laws long enforced by this 
Court.‖149 
Indeed, eight years later in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, the Court explained why defendants in copyright cases, where 
preliminary injunctions are frequently granted,
150
 also were not shielded by 
the First Amendment.  In language closely mirroring Zacchini, the Court 
                                                 
 139. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 150 (1998) (asserting that in copyright cases, 
preliminary injunctions are granted as a matter of course). 
 stated that copyright is ―the engine of free expression‖ because it provides 
an economic incentive for the creation and dissemination of ideas that 
benefit the public.
151
  The Court emphasized that copyright protections and 
the First Amendment‘s guarantee of free speech were not in conflict 
because copyright merely protects expression, not facts and ideas.
152
  The 
Court also went on to stress that copyright should not be used ―as an 
instrument to suppress facts.‖153 
The Supreme Court has not provided a similar analysis involving hot 
news misappropriation and the First Amendment.  However, a U.S. district 
court in New York addressed the issue in an early version of the Motorola 
case,
154
 which was eventually appealed to the Second Circuit.
155
  The 
defendant argued that granting the NBA injunctive relief on its hot news 
misappropriation claim would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.
156
  The 
district court rejected this argument,
157
  citing a Supreme Court decision 
that concluded that not all injunctions that affect expression rise to the level 
of a prior restraint.
158
  Based on the Court‘s reasoning in Madsen v. 
Women‟s Health Center,159 the district court explained that an injunction 
was not an unconstitutional prior restraint if:  (1) the justification for the 
injunction was content neutral (in other words, the injunction was not used 
to favor or suppress a particular point of view)
160
 and (2) the injunction did 
not permanently bar expression.
161
 
                                                 
 151. Harper, 471 U.S. at 558. 
 152. See id. at 556 (―[C]opyright‘s idea/expression dichotomy ‗strike[s] a definitional 
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free 
communication of facts while still protecting an author‘s expression.‘‖ (citation omitted)).  
For a more detailed explanation of copyright law and the facts, see supra notes 34–52 and 
accompanying text. 
 153. Harper, 471 U.S. at 559. 
 154. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939  
F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff‟d in part and vacated in part, Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. 
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 855 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 155. The Second Circuit did not address the parties‘ First Amendment arguments after 
finding that the plaintiff‘s hot news misappropriation claim failed.  Motorola, 105 F.3d at 
854.  For a more thorough discussion of the Second Circuit‘s ruling,  
see supra text accompanying notes 100–107. 
 156. Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1086. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1087; see Madsen v. Women‘s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1994) (holding 
that an injunction keeping protesters thirty-six feet from an abortion clinic did not violate 
the First Amendment). 
 159. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).  
 160. For example, the Supreme Court held that a noise ordinance targeting a 
performance venue in New York City did not violate the First Amendment because the 
ordinance was aimed at preserving a quiet area for recreational activities like walking and 
reading, not because of any disagreement with a particular message that the noise conveyed.  
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (explaining that the city was 
concerned with the volume of sound, not the value of particular performers emitting the 
sound).  Because content-neutral restrictions do not target the content of speech, such 
restrictions are not usually considered censorship and the Court sometimes applies 
intermediate scrutiny instead of strict scrutiny.  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral 
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 52 (1987) (noting that when applying intermediate 
 In applying the two-part test, the district court quickly concluded that 
granting injunctive relief for the NBA‘s hot news claim did not violate the 
First Amendment.  For the first element, the court explained that preventing 
the defendant from commercially misappropriating the NBA‘s proprietary 
rights by transmitting the league‘s scores and other data was a content-
neutral speech restriction.
162
  The court next held that the defendant was not 
―totally thwarted‖ in its efforts to use data from NBA games; the defendant 
simply could not do so in the unlawful manner chosen.
163
 
II. COPYRIGHT‘S INABILITY TO PROTECT FACTS LEAVES A CRITICAL GAP 
IN THE LAW THAT HOT NEWS MISAPPROPRIATION SHOULD FILL 
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Feist discussed in Part I demonstrates 
that the Court is unwilling to protect facts when applying copyright law.
164
  
Copyright therefore does little to prevent free-riders from profiting off 
original reporting, which this Comment will demonstrate by applying 
Feist‘s two-part analysis to a famous  
news story.
165
  Yet there is a readily available solution:  hot news 
misappropriation.
166
  The Court left open the possibility of protecting facts 
outside copyright law when it stated in Feist that, in certain circumstances, 
protecting ―the fruits of such research‖ might be possible.167  Although hot 
news misappropriation is now only recognized in a handful of states, this 
Comment will also explain why more courts should adopt the doctrine, 
provided that certain elements are readily met.
168
 
A. Copyright Law is Unable to Protect Significant Portions of News 
Stories from Free-Riding 
Under the two-part test articulated in Feist, copyright law is woefully 
ineffective at protecting news stories from free-riders.  According to Feist, 
                                                 
scrutiny to content-neutral restrictions, the Court considers the substantiality of the 
governmental interest and the availability of less restrictive alternatives). 
 161. Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1087.  In articulating this two-part test, the 
district court cited Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359, 368 n.5 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(interpreting Madsen), vacated in part on other grounds, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), aff‟d in part and rev‟d in part, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 162. Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1087.   
 163. Id.  
 164. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Court‘s rejection of ―sweat of the brow‖ and the 
justification for that rejection). 
 165. See infra Part II.A (showing how the two-part test limits a news organization‘s 
ability to protect the work that goes into lengthy investigative reporting, such as the 
Watergate scandal). 
 166. See supra Part I.B (explaining the history and evolution of the hot news doctrine 
from INS to the present day). 
 167. Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991). 
 168. See infra Part II.B (recommending the various elements that should be met for a 
valid claim of hot news misappropriation). 
 infringement occurs only when:  (1) the author of the work holds a valid 
copyright, and (2) the elements of the work that are copied are original.
169
  
To illustrate how this test applies to original reporting, consider just one 
example of the famous investigative reporting by Washington Post 
reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward during the Watergate scandal 
that led to President Nixon‘s resignation.170 
On October 17, 1972, the Post reported that Nixon‘s re-election 
committee was engaged in a massive spying campaign aimed at 
discrediting Democratic challengers, and that the Watergate break-in was 
tied to this effort.
171
  The carefully reported 2900-word story cited law 
enforcement sources, FBI and Justice Department files, and quoted a White 
House spokesman and several other officials.
172
 
Under the first element of the Feist test, the Post‘s story as a whole is 
protectable by copyright because it involves original expression, such as 
how Woodward and Bernstein arranged the facts detailing the spying 
campaign and the specific language used to articulate those facts.
173
  Thus, 
a competitor could not simply cut and paste or closely paraphrase the entire 
story onto a competing website (had such sites existed thirty years ago, of 
course).
174
  However, as the Court stated in Feist, protection for ―a factual 
compilation is thin.‖175  Under Feist‟s second prong, others remain free to 
take the facts that make up the story—in other words, they can write about 
the spying campaign and the players involved—as long as those facts are 
not presented in the same language.
176
  Thus, a free-rider could get around 
the second element in Feist by simply rewriting and rearranging the Post‘s 




                                                 
 169. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. 
 170. Nixon resigned in 1974, but the Post first reported on the Watergate break-in two 
years earlier.  See, e.g., CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT‘S MEN 13 
(1974) (describing that the tip for the Watergate break-in occurred on a Saturday in June of 
1972). 
 171. See Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged 
Democrats, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1972, at A1 (describing in considerable detail the actions 
that Nixon campaign aides took to undermine Democratic candidates, such as leaking made 
up information to the press). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 344 (explaining that while facts are not copyrightable, 
compilations of facts typically are protected); see also Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. 
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining that copyright protects ―the 
author‘s analysis or interpretation of events, the way he structures his material and marshals 
facts, his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular developments‖). 
 174. See generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (articulating the notion that 
while individual facts can be used, copyright can come into play when they are incorporated 
into a larger work).  
 175. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added). 
 176. Id.  
 177. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 71 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (holding that there was no copyright violation by the defendant when the facts 
 In the Internet era, it is easy to see how painstaking hours of research 
that went into Woodward and Bernstein‘s reporting could be rewritten, 
posted, and then used by free-riders in near real time, leaving the Post with 
little opportunity to exploit the advantage of being first.  As Associated 
Press v. All Headline News Corp. demonstrates, the business model for 
aggregators seeking to free-ride on news organizations while avoiding 
copyright infringement is clear:  first, hire poorly paid writers to find 
breaking news stories on the Internet; second, have the writers pull out the 
facts and then rewrite the information; finally, turn around and sell the 
stories to others while marketing the product as your own.
178
  A prominent 
media attorney who represented the Associated Press against All Headline 
News acknowledged that an aggregator who pursues such a strategy is 




Even if a news organization can demonstrate that a free-rider copied 
expression, copyright law provides another hurdle that a successful claim 
must overcome:  fair use.  Faced with such a lawsuit, a free-rider would 
almost certainly argue that at least a portion of the copying, such as 
headlines and other brief snippets, was protected under the fair use 
doctrine.
180
  As discussed in Part I.A, the federal Copyright Act specifically 
states that fair use of a copyrighted work for news reporting is not 
infringement.
181
  Yet no controlling precedent exists specifically involving 
aggregators and fair use, making it difficult to determine whether a fair use 
defense would ultimately succeed.
182
 
News organizations can take some solace in Harper, where the Court 
ruled there was no fair use when The Nation directly copied portions of a 
leaked manuscript, at least in part because of The Nation‟s commercial use 
of the work.
183
  Since many news free-riders stand to profit financially,
184
 
                                                 
were presented ―in a different arrangement, with a different sentence structure and different 
phrasing‖). 
 178. 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 179. See Andrew L. Deutsch, Protecting News in the Digital Era:  The Case for a 
Federalized Hot News Misappropriation Tort, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON COPYRIGHT LAW 
2010, 511, 514 (2010) (commenting that free-riders compete with original news gatherers 
because they provide a cheap alternative for news content). 
 180. See id. at 525 (asserting that an aggregator would ―certainly seek dismissal‖ of the 
case on fair use grounds). 
 181. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (detailing what types of use are 
considered fair use under the Copyright Act). 
 182. See generally FTC Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 19, at 7–8 (stating that there 
are many views as to whether aggregators fall within the fair use exception and that a ―quick 
. . . resolution is unlikely‖). 
 183. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
 184. See generally supra text accompanying notes 8–15 (discussing how aggregators are 
able to undersell traditional newspapers in online advertising). 
 Harper seems to indicate that a fair use argument would fail.
185
  However, 
in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc.,
186
 a fair use ruling nine years after 
Harper that did not involve news reporting,
187
 the Court made it clear that 
commercial use does not automatically disqualify a work from fair use.
188
  
Instead, the Court stated, ―the more transformative the new work, the less 
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may 
weigh against a finding of fair use.‖189 
Transformative works, according to the Court, ―add[] something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.‖190  One commentator suggests that at 
least one type of free-riding—search engines, which republish the headline 
and initial paragraphs of a news story—might be transformative by 
providing a reference tool for users to seek out myriad stories on a 
particular subject.
191
  Regardless of whether such an argument is 
successful, fair use is another wrinkle in copyright law that threatens to 
undermine attempts to protect original journalism. 
These concerns underscore a significant problem with copyright law 
post-Feist, which is the lack of incentive for authors to create fact-based 
works involving little creative expression.  If news organizations stop 
investing resources to cover major stories, such as Watergate, it would 
undermine one of the key goals of copyright:  promoting the broad 
availability of new works.
192
  Legal commentators suggest that the Feist 
Court might have appreciated the value of protecting facts under the ―sweat 
of the brow‖ theory if Feist had involved the struggles of news 
organizations rather than a low-stakes case that involved alphabetical 
listings in a rural Kansas phone book.
193
   
                                                 
 185. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 562 (asserting that commercial use ―is presumptively an 
unfair exploitation‖ of copyrighted material (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984))). 
 186. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 187. Instead, the case involved the musical group 2 Live Crew, which was accused of 
violating the copyright of the song ―Oh Pretty Woman‖ after parodying it.  Id. at 571–72. 
 188. See id. at 572 (announcing that a work‘s ―commercial character is only one element 
to be weighed in a fair use enquiry‖). 
 189. Id. at 579 (emphasis added). 
 190. Id.  
 191. Deutsch, supra note 179, at 531–32.  For support, Deutsch cites to Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir.), amended on reh‟g by, 508 F.3d 1146 
(9th Cir. 2007), in which the Ninth Circuit held that Google‘s use of thumbnail images of 
copyrighted works was ―highly transformative‖ and thus likely fair use.  However, no other 
circuit has adopted this ruling. 
 192. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”?  Copyright and Other Protection of Works of 
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 349 (1992) (noting that 
granting authors exclusive rights to their works was ―thought to encourage production,‖ 
thereby benefitting society).  
 193. See generally Sanford et al., supra note 24, at 8 (stating that Feist shows that ―bad 
facts make bad law‖ and that the facts in Feist are ―comically out of step with the realities of 
publishing today‖). 
 Yet, these commentators note, ―the trouble with Feist as the high noon 
moment for the ‗sweat of the brow‘ theory is that there just wasn‘t much 
sweat to speak of.‖194  Unfortunately, any attempt to amend copyright law 
post-Feist to protect facts is unlikely because the Court rooted its decision 
in the Constitution.
195
  A clear alternative is needed. 
B. A Narrow Application of Hot News Misappropriation Should Fill the 
Void Left by Copyright 
Because copyright law fails to adequately protect original news content 
from free-riders, more courts should allow plaintiffs to invoke narrow, INS-
like hot news misappropriation claims.  Applying a slight variation of the 
five-part test established by the Second Circuit in Motorola is a critical 
starting point.
196
  However, those elements are not enough; courts should 
take two additional steps as part of an expanded legal framework that is 
intended to minimize First Amendment concerns and further ensure that 
successful claims closely conform with INS.
197
  This Comment will refer to 
the expanded test as ―Motorola plus.‖  
To determine whether a claim survives preemption, courts should first 
turn to the Motorola analysis,
198
 with a slight change to the fifth element:
199
  
(1) the plaintiff generates information at a cost, (2) the information is time-
sensitive, (3) the defendant‘s use of the information constitutes free-riding, 
(4) the defendant‘s product or service is in direct competition with the 
plaintiff‘s product or service, and (5) the defendant‘s free-riding is likely to 
reduce the plaintiff‘s incentive to produce the product or service, thereby 
threatening its existence.
200
  As the Second Circuit plainly stated in 
Motorola, elements two, three, and five distinguish hot news claims from 
those involving copyright infringement, thus allowing the doctrine to 
survive preemption.
201
  This Comment will discuss preemption in more 
detail in Part III.A. 
                                                 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)  
(―It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler‘s labor may be used by others 
without compensation. . . . [H]owever, this is not some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory 
scheme.  It is, rather, the essence of copyright and a constitutional requirement.‖(internal 
quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
 196. See infra text accompanying notes 198–204 (laying out the five-part test and 
explaining why changes were made to the fifth element). 
 197. See infra text accompanying notes 208–218 (explaining the two extra elements and 
why they are needed). 
 198. See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(establishing five elements that the court asserts must be met for an INS-like claim to 
survive federal preemption). 
 199. See generally infra text accompanying notes 201–204 (explaining the reason for the 
change in wording from Motorola). 
 200. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 845. 
 201. Id. at 853. 
 The wording of the fifth element has been altered slightly from Motorola 
to make it clear that the plaintiff is not required to show statistical proof 
that its business has already been damaged, similar to the facts in INS.
202
  
Rather, a court should be able to infer that such damage would likely occur 
if the defendant‘s free-riding continued.203  This ensures that the doctrine is 
applied by the courts before extensive economic damage is inflicted on the 
plaintiff, at which point accurate monetary damages might be difficult—if 
not impossible—to calculate, and the court would be forced to speculate.204 
Besides fortifying hot news misappropriation from preemption concerns, 
the fourth and fifth elements of the Motorola test play an important public 
policy role by ensuring that successful claims are limited to instances of 
systematic copying that substantially harm the plaintiff.  This should ease 
fears that news organizations will use hot news misappropriation to target 
individuals who post occasional news headlines and blurbs on social 
networking sites like Facebook and Twitter—claims that could become so 
numerous as to be impractical for courts to handle given the minor 
damages likely to be at stake.
205
  Indeed, without evidence of systematic 
copying, a plaintiff will be hard-pressed to show that occasional copying 
threatens its existence, as required by element five.
206
  And the direct 
competition requirement in element four eliminates claims where the 
alleged harm is insignificant, such as when the defendant is not competing 
with the plaintiff for the same revenue or market share.
207
 
                                                 
 202. See Int‟l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 230 (1918) (discussing the 
considerable cost AP incurred in gathering the news but failing to address the specific 
financial harm suffered by the wire service as a result of INS‘ free-riding);  
see also Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (rejecting defendant‘s attempt to require the plaintiffs to show actual damages). 
 203. In INS, the Court did not require direct proof that AP had been harmed in order to 
rule in its favor.  See Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 241 (noting the ―obvious results‖ of INS‘ 
actions toward AP). 
 204. See generally Which Kind of Damages Are Available in IP Disputes?, WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/enforcement/en/faq/judiciary/faq08.html (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2011) (explaining that establishing the true extent of infringement for 
purposes of calculating damages in intellectual property cases is ―notoriously difficult,‖ 
especially if the infringement occurs online). 
 205. See Brief for Amici Curiae Google, Inc. & Twitter, Inc. in Support of Reversal at 
12, Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., No. 10-1372-cv (2nd Cir. June 21, 
2010) (asserting that it would be impossible to restrict the dissemination of news in a world 
of citizen journalists). 
 206. Systematic copying was a key element in the first hot news misappropriation case.  
See Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 231 (detailing that INS repeatedly misappropriated AP‘s 
stories by taking numerous articles off bulletin boards or from early-edition newspapers that 
included AP content).  Systematic copying also occurred in a recent, successful hot news 
misappropriation case.  See Barclays Capital Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d at 342–43 (explaining 
that Theflyonthewall.com frequently misappropriated and reported the banks‘ research 
recommendations).  
 207. See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(defeating a hot news claim because the NBA, which primarily produces live basketball 
games, did not directly compete with the defendant, which sold and marketed a pager 
featuring sports data). 
 If all five elements in Motorola are satisfied, courts should next inquire 
whether protecting the plaintiff‘s information will provide a tangible, 
useful benefit to society.
208
  After all, the primary goal of protecting 
intellectual property under the commonly used utilitarian theory is not to 
reward the author; instead, the goal is to provide authors with adequate 
economic incentive to create new works that promote ―the [p]rogress of 
Science and useful Arts.‖209  As this Comment will discuss more 
thoroughly in Part III.B, these goals mirror those of the First 
Amendment.
210
  If authors do not have adequate economic incentive to 
create useful works, then fewer such works will be created and one of the 
amendment‘s key objectives—promoting the exchange of ideas—will be 
lessened.
211
  While ensuring the survival of original news reporting, which 
keeps the citizenry informed, clearly meets this additional standard,
212
 other 
fact-based works outside the scope of this Comment might also pass this 
test.
213
  Ultimately, the courts have wide discretion in determining what is 
useful and thus deserving of hot news protection.  
Next, the plaintiff should be required to show that it had the information 
first.  As the Supreme Court stated in INS, the value of news depends 
―chiefly upon its novelty and freshness.‖214  Thus, if the plaintiff is not first 
with the information, the work‘s societal value may be diminished to the 
point where the benefits of providing protection no longer outweigh the 
costs.
215
  The element of ―firstness‖ also should help courts weed out 
claims for which there is no effective remedy.  Consider, for example, 
situations in which myriad organizations are covering a breaking news 
story such as a natural disaster, when news unfolds rapidly and information 
                                                 
 208. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use:  First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 355 (1999) 
(insisting that any departure from the idea that communicated information is free be 
―specifically justified‖).  
 209. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see also Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (emphasizing the role copyright plays in promoting 
the progress of science and useful arts); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151, 156 (1975) (concluding that while motivating the author is important, copyright‘s 
ultimate goal is to ―stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good‖). 
 210. See infra text accompanying notes 260–266.  The Motorola court did not address 
the First Amendment after determining that the plaintiff‘s claim was preempted by the five-
part test.  See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 854 n.10 (relegating to a footnote the statement that 
there was no need to address the defendant‘s free speech concerns). 
 211. See infra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 212. See FTC Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 19, at 5 (illustrating how reporting can 
improve society by providing an example of how investigative reporting can bring about 
reforms at a local hospital, which in turn can lead to better health care). 
 213. See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 343 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that banks‘ equity research plays an important role in pricing 
stocks fairly, thereby helping to ensure an efficient allocation of capital). 
 214. Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 238 (1918). 
 215. Cf. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 14 (2003) (explaining that if a good is not scarce and has no 
exchange value, then ―the social value of property rights will be slight or even negative‖). 
 that is valuable one moment is stale the next.
216
  In these instances, 
establishing a limited property right in the news has little practical value—a 
point AP itself made in its brief to the Supreme Court in INS.
217
  In many 
other circumstances, however, firstness will be clearly discernable—such 
as when a news organization is first to report a story after an investigation 




Besides meeting these seven requirements, the plaintiff must overcome 
several key defenses by an alleged hot news infringer.  The plaintiff must 
show that it not only broke the news, but that the copying outlet did not 
independently report the story on its own.
219
  Additionally, courts should 
allow defendants to defeat a plaintiff‘s hot news claim if the defendant 
shows that the information was used for commentary or criticism of news 
reporting, similar to some of the fair use protections under copyright law.
220
 
If all these elements are met, the plaintiff‘s remedy should be injunctive 
relief that lasts only until the commercial value of the news has ―passed 
away.‖221  As addressed by element five of the Motorola test, a monetary 
remedy is unworkable because it would place courts in the awkward 
position of speculating on the exact impact of the unauthorized copying.
222
  
Injunctive relief also has an obvious shortcoming:  it cannot reverse the 
harm caused by unauthorized copying that has already occurred.  However, 
injunctions will allow news organizations to halt the systematic free-riding 




                                                 
 216. Cf. Jarvis, supra note 110 (quoting the head of Thomson Reuters, who stated that 
his news is valuable for mere ―milliseconds‖). 
 217. See EKSTRAND, supra note 70, at 73 (―If conditions of the world were such that 
every happening anywhere became automatically known to everybody everywhere, there 
could hardly be any property value in news; but as the world actually is, a great organization 
of vigilance, investigation, transmission and distribution is necessary to connect the fact 
with those who wish to know it.‖ (quoting Brief for Respondent, at 11–12, INS)). 
 218. The Washington Post‘s coverage of Watergate is one example.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 170–172 (describing how the Post spent two years investigating 
aspects of the Watergate break-in). 
 219. Cf. Schonfeld, supra note 111 (arguing that for INS to be valid today AP would 
have to demonstrate evidence of news stories in which its journalists broke the news and 
where it was the only news organization to do so). 
 220. See Deutsch, supra note 179, at 588 (urging the adoption of a similar defense while 
outlining a proposal for a federal hot news tort). 
 221. See Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245–46 (1918) (declining to 
specify a specific injunction against INS and instead directing the lower court ―to deal with 
the matter upon appropriate application made to it for the purpose‖). 
 222. See supra text accompanying notes 202–204. 
 223. Because hot news misappropriation deals with systematic copying, injunctive relief 
also should not prompt a rush to the courthouse every time unauthorized copying occurs, an 
issue that was not addressed by INS nor the most recent court that considered injunctive 
relief involving hot news misappropriation.  See Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 245–46 
(discussing only the amount of time an injunction should last, and even then avoiding 
prescribing any specific time limit); Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. 
 The Court in INS did not provide any specific guidance about the length 
of time an injunction should last,
224
 and this Comment sees no need to 
prescribe an exact time limit either.  Instead, the courts should provide the 
plaintiff with just enough lead time necessary to ensure continued 
investment in newsgathering.
225
  Normally, the originator of valuable 
information has an opportunity to exploit the natural lead time of being 
first.
226
  The instantaneousness of the Internet, however, all but eliminates 
this advantage because information is copied and pasted almost instantly.
227
  
While at least one commentator suggests that hot news protections last 
twenty-four hours,
228
 such a rigid approach is unhelpful.  Hot news 
protections can expire sooner, depending on the facts of the case.  For 
example, in Theflyonthewall.com, a New York federal court prevented a 
financial website from publishing some information until thirty minutes 
after the stock market opened.
229
   
Rather than leaving hot news misappropriation in the common law, some 
commentators have suggested that Congress amend the Copyright Act to 
include hot news protections
230
 or federalize the doctrine by passing a hot 
news statute.
231
  Such an approach is unnecessary—at least for now.  The 
                                                 
Supp. 2d 310, 346–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (prescribing only the amount of time the injunction 
should last). 
 224. Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 245–46. 
 225. See Barclays Capital Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d at 345–46 (stating that determining the 
right amount of lead time is important so as to give the plaintiff enough incentive to create 
the valued work without also giving the plaintiff an opportunity to ―squeeze every last cent 
out of their efforts to the exclusion of others‖).  See also T.B. MACAULAY, Copyright I.  
(February 5, 1941), in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY:  
SPEECHES AND LEGAL STUDIES 235, 241 (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1900) (stating in an 1841 
speech on copyright before Britain‘s House of Commons that ―monopoly is an evil.  For the 
sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than 
is necessary for the purpose of securing the good‖). 
 226. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (1995) (stating that 
lead time typically allows the originator to recover the costs of gathering the valuable 
information, thereby encouraging continued investment). 
 227. See Marburger, supra note 4 (explaining that due to the ease with which one can 
repost material online, a reader can now find equally fresh news on both a newspaper‘s 
official website and on a free-rider‘s website). 
 228. See Clay Calvert et al., All the News That‟s Fit to Own:  Hot News on the Internet & 
the Commodification of News in Digital Culture, 10 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 28–
29 n.183 (2009–2010) (noting a suggested change to copyright law that would provide 
journalists protection for the facts they uncover for a twenty-four hour period following 
publication). 
 229. See Barclays Capital Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d at 347 (declining to provide injunctive 
relief beyond the ―minimum level of protection necessary to ensure that a socially valuable 
product is not driven out of the market through unfair competition‖). 
 230. See Holte, supra note 4 at 32–33 (suggesting that either the fair use provision of the 
Copyright Act should be amended to include added protections or an entirely new section 
should be added concerning news reporting). 
 231. See Deutsch, supra note 179, at 579–80 (arguing that leaving hot news to state 
judges could lead to a variety of standards while a federalized doctrine would instead 
streamline the process); Sanford & Brown, supra note 17, at A15 (arguing that the doctrine 
should be federalized because it is only recognized in a handful of states).  
 rapid evolution of the Internet and digital communications means that 
implementing legislation now could have unforeseen consequences, 
difficult to undo as technology evolves.
 232
  Instead, the courts should take a 
more measured approach, allowing hot news misappropriation cases to play 
out within the ―Motorola plus‖ framework as new challenges unfold.  
Although this framework is rigorous, a plaintiff faced with the systematic, 
INS-like free-riding of its content—a growing problem in the Internet 
age
233—should find success. 
III. WHY A NARROW APPLICATION OF HOT NEWS MISAPPROPRIATION IS A 
WORKABLE SOLUTION 
The two major criticisms of hot news—that the doctrine is preempted by 
federal copyright law and that it infringes on the First Amendment—are not 
an issue under the ―Motorola-plus‖ framework.  Some legal scholars argue 
that all hot news misappropriation claims are preempted by the 1976 
Copyright Act.
234
  However, this Comment argues that the wording of the 
statute and congressional intent at the time the act was passed explicitly 
carve out an exception for narrow INS-like claims.
235
  This Comment also 
argues that hot news misappropriation preserves, rather than hinders, free 
speech by providing an economic incentive for the creation of useful new 
works.
236
  And, much like other intellectual property protections, such as 




A. Hot News Survives Preemption Because the Doctrine Does Not Cover 
Copyrightable Subject Matter  
Federal copyright law does not preempt hot news misappropriation if the 
doctrine is carefully applied.  Although legal scholars and the courts have 
                                                 
 232. See EKSTRAND, supra note 70, at 163 (concluding that a poorly designed statute 
could harm the public domain in ways that hot news currently does not). 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 1–15 (illustrating the challenges that free-riding 
poses to the news industry). 
 234. There are two schools of thought on state law with respect to intellectual property:  
an expansive view and a minimalist view.  See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 145, at 947 
(explaining that the expansive approach believes state law can fill gaps in protection under 
federal law, while the minimalist approach views state laws more cautiously because of their 
tendency to remove information from the public domain).  Marburger, supra note 6, 
provides an example of the minimalist approach by stating that there is no preemption 
exception for the ruling in INS. 
 235. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.  
 236. See infra text accompanying notes 259–269. 
 237. See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 347 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (limiting an injunction against a free-riding website to a two-hour period to 
allow the originally reporting party adequate lead time). 
 varying viewpoints that fail to definitively resolve the issue,
238
 the language 
of the Copyright Act provides a helpful starting point.  As discussed in Part 
I.B, state laws are preempted by copyright law only when they:  (1) cover 
works fixed in a tangible medium of expression, (2) cover subject matter 
specifically defined by copyright law, and (3) create legal or equitable 
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the ―general 
scope‖ of the federal Copyright Act.239 
The first and third elements are the most problematic for hot news 
misappropriation.  Because nearly all news stories transmit facts in the 
form of words, sounds or pictures, the first preemption requirement will 
almost always be met.
240
  The third preemption requirement is also easily 
satisfied because hot news misappropriation, in allowing a court to issue an 
injunction that prevents a competitor from using the same facts, provides 
an equivalent remedy to the Copyright Act; both doctrines grant exclusivity 
to one party at the expense of another for a limited time.
241
 
However, there is little consistency among the courts‘ various 
interpretations of the second element.
242
  Prior to Feist, when some courts 
protected fact-based works to provide an incentive for their creation, the 
argument that copyright law preempted hot news misappropriation was 
stronger because facts, at least occasionally, came within the general 
subject matter of copyright protection.
243
  In Feist, however, the Court 
made it explicitly clear that copyright does not protect facts or ideas.
244
  
This is so, the Court said, because ―facts do not owe their origin to an act of 
authorship.‖245  The Court even went so far as to state that the Constitution 
                                                 
 238. See supra note 234 (illustrating the diverging scholarly viewpoints on the issue).  
Compare Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that there is no federal preemption), with Lowry‘s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, 
Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 756 (D. Md. 2003) (suggesting that hot news misappropriation 
might be preempted by the Copyright Act in limited circumstances). 
 239. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). 
 240. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (explaining that under the Copyright Act, the 
form of fixation can mean ―words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphical 
or symbolic indicia‖). 
 241. Compare Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245 (1918) (holding 
that hot news misappropriation allows AP to prevent INS from copying its stories as long as 
the news has value), with 17 U.S.C. § 106 (stating that a copyright holder has the exclusive 
right to reproduce the protected work). 
 242. Contrary to the Second Circuit in Motorola, the Fifth Circuit has taken a strict 
approach, finding preemption as long as the work falls within the broad confines of 
copyright law.  See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that a state software protection statute is preempted because it ―touches upon an 
area‖ of federal copyright law). 
 243. See Jeweler‘s Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 95 (2nd Cir. 1922) 
(establishing the ―sweat of the brow‖ theory). 
 244. See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) 
(―[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to 
build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.‖). 
 245. Id. at 347.  To be clear, compilations of facts are a different matter altogether.  See 
id. at 348 (explaining that in compiling facts, the author shows enough originality—by 
 required such a determination.
246
  Thus, Feist underscores a critical 
distinction between hot news, which protects information, and copyright, 
which protects expression.  Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor‘s majority 
opinion seems to acknowledge this distinction in a footnote addressing 
what impact Feist had on INS.
247
  Rather than overrule INS, as the Court 
could have done if copyright preempted hot news, O‘Connor instead wrote 
that INS ―ultimately rendered judgment for Associated Press on 
noncopyright grounds that are not relevant here.‖248 
Additionally, the American Law Institute‘s formal commentary 
accompanying the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition stopped just 
short of suggesting there was no place for INS alongside the 1976 
Copyright Act.
249
  Instead, the commentary urged against a broad 
application of INS so as not to undermine the policy reasons behind 
copyright law‘s limitations,250 yet acknowledged that the unusual 
circumstances of INS ―present the most compelling case for protection 
against appropriation.‖251 
The 1976 Copyright Act and its legislative history provide still more 
evidence against the preemption of hot news.  Section 102(b) specifies that 
certain elements contained within works of authorship do not fall under 
copyright‘s scope:  ―In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method 
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .‖252  More significantly, 
the House Report discussing the 1976 Copyright Act explicitly indicates 
that lawmakers intended for the hot news doctrine to survive preemption:   
 [S]tate law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under 
traditional principles of equity) against a consistent pattern of 
unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the 
literary expression) constituting ―hot‖ news, whether in the traditional 
mold of International News Service v. Associated Press . . .  




Some commentators have downplayed this language because the bill that 
Congress ultimately passed deleted language that stated hot news 
                                                 
choosing which facts to include and in what order to place them—to receive protection 
through copyright law). 
 246. Id. at 340. 
 247. See id. at 354 n.* (stating in a footnote that judgment was ultimately granted in 
favor of Associated Press). 
 248. Id. (emphasis added). 
 249. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. e. (1995). 
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. at cmt. c. 
 252. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).   
 253. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.  
 misappropriation was saved from preemption.
254
  But the Second Circuit in 
Motorola cited the House Report in asserting that ―it is generally agreed 
that a ‗hot-news‘ INS-like claim survives preemption.‖255  The Second 
Circuit stated that the central question was not whether hot news survived 
preemption, but rather the ―breadth of the ‗hot news‘ claim that 
survives.‖256  As illustrated in Part II.B, the breath is narrow, but sufficient 
enough to provide news organizations relief from systematic free-riding.
257
 
B. Hot News, Like Other Forms of Intellectual Property, Does Not 
Undermine the First Amendment 
The other major concern about hot news misappropriation is that it 
violates free speech.
258
  To understand why this is not the case, it is 
important to view the principles behind hot news in the same context as 




Reconciling the First Amendment with the Constitution‘s so-called 
―Copyright Clause‖ might seem infeasible at first glance.  After all, the 
First Amendment ensures the free flow of information and expression 
while Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution allows authors to restrict the 
free flow of certain information and expression.
260
  Yet the Supreme Court 
acknowledges that both parts of the Constitution actually serve the same 
goal of encouraging a robust exchange of ideas; each part just goes about it 
a different way.
261
  While the First Amendment stands for the principle that 
                                                 
 254. See Holte, supra note 4, at 28–29 (arguing that because Congress excluded such 
language from its final legislation, their intent remains unclear). 
 255. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
 256. Id. at 850. 
 257. See supra discussion Part II.B. 
 258. See, e.g., Bayard supra note 129 (arguing that the First Amendment is an important 
issue because it was not addressed by INS and because the doctrine has grown stronger over 
the years); Art Brodsky, Oh, the Hypocrisy:  First Amendment Attorneys Would Destroy the 
Internet to Save Newspapers, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2009, 3:26 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/art-brodsky/oh-the-hypocrisy-first-am_b_204809.html 
(denouncing added protections for the news industry because of the harm that would cause 
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 259. See Andrew L. Deutsch et al., „Hot News‟ and the „Duty to Police‟ It, LAW TECH. 
NEWS (May 18, 2010)  
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202458321278 
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infringement‖). 
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freedom of speech . . . .‖), with U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (―To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖). 
 261. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stating that because the 
Copyright Clause and First Amendment were both adopted about the same time, the 
Framers must have viewed copyright‘s limited monopolies as compatible with free speech); 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (asserting that 
 government censorship of expression harms the flow of information, 
intellectual property protections stand for the principle that if authors are 
not provided with economic incentives to create works that require 




Because hot news misappropriation provides the same economic 
incentives for useful works as other intellectual property protections, the 
doctrine is not in conflict with the First Amendment.  There are, of course, 
important distinctions between the various intellectual property doctrines—
including copyright and hot news.  As discussed in Part I.C, the Supreme 
Court pointed out in Harper ―that copyright‘s idea/expression dichotomy 
strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the 
Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still 
protecting an author‘s expression.‖263  Critics of hot news misappropriation 
argue that by protecting the facts, hot news obliterates this careful balance 
and treads on the First Amendment where copyright does not.
264
  However, 
such an argument ignores the very real threat to free speech if free-riding is 
allowed to continue unabated.  If news organizations lack an economic 
incentive to produce original journalism, the creation and dissemination of 
information that the First Amendment purports to advance is harmed.
265
  As 
one commentator noted, if every work of public interest could be pirated 
away by a competitor, ―the public [soon] would have nothing worth 
reading.‖266   
Additionally, even though hot news misappropriation protects facts, this 
protection is extremely limited.  First, the five-part test established by the 
Second Circuit in Motorola, and incorporated into this Comment‘s 
―Motorola-plus‖ framework, makes it clear that the hot news doctrine does 
not target members of the general public.
267
  Instead, the doctrine gives 
                                                 
intellectual property protections, specifically copyright law, encourage free expression by 
providing authors with an incentive to create new ideas). 
 262. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 558 (explaining that copyright provides the economic 
incentive to fuel new expression); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,  
433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (noting that the right of publicity doctrine provided a performer 
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 263. Harper, 471 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added) (citation and internal punctuation 
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 264. See Volokh, supra note 133 at 1070–71 (stating that if the Court were to confront 
the issue of hot news and the First Amendment, it should rule that the doctrine is 
unconstitutional).  
 265. See generally Marburger, supra note 4 (stating that the threat from free-riders will 
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 266. Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment:  A Gathering Storm?,  
19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 78 (1971). 
 267. See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that hot news only survives preemption when five elements are met, including that 
the defendant is in direct competition with the plaintiff). 
 news gatherers a right to stop only systematic free-riding by direct 
competitors, and even then only for a limited time.
268
  Additionally, hot 
news does not limit competitors from researching and reporting the same 
facts on their own—it only prevents them from taking from others.269  
Thus, concerns that hot news gives plaintiffs a monopoly on the facts are 
overblown.   
Finally, although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed hot news 
and the First Amendment, the Court has asserted that not all injunctions are 
unconstitutional prior restraints.
270
  As discussed in Part I.C, subsequent 
courts have stated that an injunction is valid if:  (1) the justification for the 
injunction was content neutral, and  
(2) the injunction itself did not permanently bar expression.
271
   
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that deciding whether a 
particular regulation is content-based or content neutral can be difficult,
272
 
hot news misappropriation is straightforward.  Hot news is content neutral 
because the doctrine on its face does not seek to restrict particular types of 
facts; rather, the doctrine merely distinguishes the manner in which facts 
were obtained (whether through original newsgathering or by free-riding 
off someone else‘s work).273  The doctrine‘s objective is also unrelated to 
content.  The purpose is not to favor one type of reporting over another, but 
to provide an economic incentive for original newsgathering so that 
Americans can remain informed.
274
  The Court has made similar arguments 
regarding other regulations that, like hot news misappropriation, were 
aimed at preserving valuable existing media organizations, specifically free 
                                                 
 268. Id.   
 269. See generally Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 
341 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that the key element in hot news misappropriation is free-
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 270. See Madsen v. Women‘s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (holding that 
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Besides being content neutral, granting injunctive relief for hot news 
misappropriation does not permanently bar expression.  Like the district 
court‘s ruling in the decision that preceded Motorola, in which the judge 
stated that the defendant was ―not totally thwarted‖ in its efforts to use 
particular facts,
276
 the same principle applies to hot news cases in general.  
Free-riders who are faced with an injunction but wish to publish the facts 
have two readily available options:  they can either independently confirm 
the facts, at which point they will have a complete defense to hot news 
misappropriation, or they can wait for the time limit created by the 
injunction to expire.
277
  After all, hot news misappropriation—as 
recommended by this Comment and as applied by the courts—only 
restricts the use of the facts for a limited time.
278
  Moreover, although the 
Supreme Court has said that prior restraint ―freezes‖ speech at least for as 
long as the injunction lasts,
279
 that is not the case with hot news.  An 
injunction against a free-rider in no way prohibits the public from accessing 
the facts. 
Finally, in any argument involving hot news and concerns about the First 
Amendment, it is important to keep in mind a statement made by Justice 
Robert H. Jackson more than 60 years ago.  ―There is danger,‖ Justice 
Jackson said, ―that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a 
little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into 
a suicide pact.‖280  Justice Jackson, writing a dissenting opinion in 
Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
281
 was expressing concern that the Court 
had gone too far when it overturned a ―breach of peace‖ ordinance in 
Chicago on First Amendment grounds.
282
  The majority held that one 
purpose of free speech was to invite unrest and even stir people to anger.
283
  
Thus, the Court reversed the conviction of Arthur Terminiello, who was 
fined for giving a speech in which he criticized numerous racial groups, 
angering the crowd that had gathered to the extent that police could not 
                                                 
 275. See supra notes 273–274. 
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 maintain order.
284
  Justice Jackson, however, explained that Terminiello 
was not being prevented from speaking, only that he could not claim the 
Constitution prohibited him from being punished.
285
  Jackson also warned 
that over the long run, free speech would become more endangered if 
people were not protected from its abuses.
286
 
Like the suicide pact that Jackson articulated in Terminiello, the 
Constitution‘s First Amendment protections should not be used to destroy 
news organizations while supporting the abuses of free-riders; to do so 
would undermine—not advance—the purposes of free speech. 
CONCLUSION 
The news industry is very much in peril.  The recent closings of daily 
newspapers like the Rocky Mountain News in Denver and the Seattle Post-
Intelligencer reflect the economic pressures facing the media as more 
readers get their news online.
287
  News organizations are evolving to meet 
these needs.
288
  Yet unless something is done to stop free-riders from 
systematically rewriting fresh, original news reporting—often gathered at 
considerable cost—and undercutting its value by selling bargain-rate ads, 
the industry‘s ability to adapt could be thwarted.289   
Hot news misappropriation is an important solution that, if carefully 
applied to INS-like situations, avoids federal preemption and does not 
conflict with the First Amendment.  Specifically, courts should adopt the 
―Motorola-plus‖ framework that incorporates the five-element test 
established in National Basketball Ass‟n v. Motorola, Inc.290 while ensuring 
that the plaintiff is not required to show statistical proof that its business 
has been damaged.
291
  This framework also suggests that courts limit 
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 successful hot news misappropriation claims to situations in which the 
information provides a useful benefit to society
292
 and where the plaintiff 
obtained the protected information first.
293
  Critics are wrong to suggest 
that hot news has no place in the law.  If courts carefully apply the doctrine, 
hot news misappropriation can be used to benefit society when no other 
form of intellectual property protection applies. 
 
                                                 
 292. See supra text accompanying notes 208–213 (asserting that by grounding hot news 
misappropriation in public policy, the doctrine‘s protections are justified for the same reason 
as other intellectual property laws). 
 293. See supra text accompanying notes 216–218 (discussing situations when this 
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